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Abstract 
Significant differences exist in the availability of healthcare worker (HCW) SARS-
CoV-2 testing between countries, and existing programmes focus on screening 
symptomatic rather than asymptomatic staff. Over a 3-week period (April 2020), 1,032 
asymptomatic HCWs were screened for SARS-CoV-2 in a large UK teaching hospital. 
Symptomatic staff and symptomatic household contacts were additionally tested. Real-
time RT-PCR was used to detect viral RNA from a throat+nose self-swab.  
 
3% of HCWs in the asymptomatic screening group tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. 
17/30 (57%) were truly asymptomatic/pauci-symptomatic. 12/30 (40%) had 
experienced symptoms compatible with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) >7 days 
prior to testing, most self-isolating, returning well. Clusters of HCW infection were 
discovered on two independent wards.  Viral genome sequencing showed that the 
majority of HCWs had the dominant lineage B∙1. Our data demonstrates the utility of 
comprehensive screening of HCWs with minimal or no symptoms. This approach will 
be critical for protecting patients and hospital staff. 
 
  
Introduction 
Despite the World Health Organisation (WHO) advocating widespread testing for 
SARS-CoV-2, national capacities for implementation have diverged considerably.1,2 In 
the UK, the strategy has been to perform SARS-CoV-2 testing for essential workers 
who are symptomatic themselves or have symptomatic household contacts. This 
approach has been exemplified by recent studies of symptomatic HCWs.3,4 The role of 
nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is becoming increasingly recognised, 
accounting for 12-29% of cases in some reports.5 Importantly, data suggest that the 
severity and mortality risk of nosocomial transmission may be greater than for 
community-acquired COVID-19.6  
 
Protection of HCWs and their families from the acquisition of COVID-19 in hospitals 
is paramount, and underscored by rising numbers of HCW deaths nationally and 
internationally.7,8 In previous epidemics, HCW screening programmes have boosted 
morale, decreased absenteeism and potentially reduced long-term psychological 
sequelae.9 Screening also allows earlier return to work when individuals or their family 
members test negative.3,4 Another major consideration is the protection of vulnerable 
patients from a potentially infectious workforce6, particularly as social distancing is not 
possible whilst caring for patients. Early identification and isolation of infectious 
HCWs may help prevent onward transmission to patients and colleagues, and targeted 
infection prevention and control measures may reduce the risk of healthcare-associated 
outbreaks. 
 
The clinical presentation of COVID-19 can include minimal or no symptoms.10 
Asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic transmission is clearly reported and is estimated to 
account for around half of all cases of COVID-19.11 Screening approaches focussed 
solely on symptomatic HCWs are therefore unlikely to be adequate for suppression of 
nosocomial spread. Preliminary data suggests that mass screening and isolation of 
asymptomatic individuals can be an effective method for halting transmission in 
community-based settings.12 Recent modelling has suggested that weekly testing of 
asymptomatic HCWs could reduce onward transmission by 16-23%, on top of isolation 
based on symptoms, provided results are available within 24 hours.13 The need for 
widespread adoption of an expanded screening programme for asymptomatic, as well 
as symptomatic HCWs, is apparent.13-15 
 
Challenges to the roll-out of an expanded screening programme include the ability to 
increase diagnostic testing capacity, logistical issues affecting sampling and turnaround 
times and concerns about workforce depletion should substantial numbers of staff test 
positive. Here, we describe how we have dealt with these challenges and present initial 
findings from a comprehensive staff screening programme at Cambridge University 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (CUHNFT). This has included systematic screening 
of >1,000 asymptomatic HCWs in their workplace, in addition to >200 symptomatic 
staff or household contacts. Screening was performed using a validated real-time 
reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR) assay detecting SARS-CoV-2 from combined 
oropharyngeal (OP) and nasopharyngeal (NP) swabs.16 Rapid viral sequencing of 
positive samples was used to further assess potential epidemiological linkage where 
nosocomial transmission was suspected. Our experience highlights the value of 
programmes targeting both symptomatic and asymptomatic staff, and will be 
informative for the establishment of similar programmes in the UK and globally. 
 
 
Results 
Characteristics of HCW and testing groups 
Between 6th and 24th April 2020, 1,270 HCWs in CUHNFT and their symptomatic 
household contacts were swabbed and tested for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time RT-PCR. 
The median age of the HCWs was 34; 71% were female and 29% male. The technical 
RT-PCR failure rate was 2/1,270 (0∙2% see Methods); these were excluded from the 
‘Tested’ population for further analysis. Ultimately, 5% (n=61) of swabs were SARS-
CoV-2 positive. 21 individuals underwent repeat testing for a variety of reasons, 
including evolving symptoms (n=3) and scoring ‘medium’ probability on clinical 
COVID-19 criteria (Tables S1-S2) (n=11). All remained SARS-CoV-2 negative. Turn 
around time from sample collection to resulting was 12-36 hours; this varied according 
to the time samples were obtained. 
 
Table 1 outlines the total number of SARS-CoV-2 tests performed in each screening 
group (HCW asymptomatic, HCW symptomatic, and HCW symptomatic household 
contact) categorised according to the ward with the highest anticipated risk of exposure 
to COVID-19 (‘red’, high; ‘amber’, medium; ‘green’, low; table S1). In total, 31/1,032 
(3%) of those tested in the HCW asymptomatic screening group tested SARS-CoV-2 
positive. In comparison, 30/221 (14%) tested positive when HCW symptomatic and 
HCW symptomatic household contact screening groups were combined. As expected, 
symptomatic HCWs and their household contacts were significantly more likely to test 
positive than HCWs from the asymptomatic screening group (p<0∙0001, Fisher’s exact 
test). HCWs working in ‘red’ or ‘amber’ wards were significantly more likely to test 
positive than those working in ‘green’ wards (p=0∙0042, Fisher’s exact test). 
 
 
Clinical Area 
 
Green Amber Red Unknown Total 
HCW asymptomatic 
screening group 
7/454 
(1∙5%) 
4/78 
(5∙1%) 
20/466 
(4∙3%) 
0/34        
(0%) 
31/1032 
(3%) 
HCW symptomatic 
screening group 
8/66 
(12.1%) 
1/9 
(11∙1%) 
17/88 
(19∙3%) 
0/6          
(0%) 
26/169 
(15∙4%) 
HCW symptomatic 
household contacts 
2/14 
(14.∙3%) 
0/1 
 (0%) 
0/14  
(0%) 
2/23  
(8∙7%) 
4/52 
(7∙7%) 
Unknown 0/4 (0%) 0/0 0/7 (0%) 0/4 (0%) 0/15 (0%) 
All 17/538 
(3∙2%) 
5/88 
(5∙7%) 
37/575 
(6∙4%) 
2/67 
 (3%) 
61/1268 
(4∙8%) 
Table 1. Total number of SARS-CoV-2 tests performed in each screening group 
categorised according to the highest risk ward of potential exposure. 
 
Viral loads varied between individuals, potentially reflecting the nature of the sampling 
site. However, for individuals testing positive for SARS-CoV-2, viral loads were 
significantly lower for those in the HCW asymptomatic screening group than in those 
tested due to the presence of symptoms (Figure 1). For the HCW symptomatic and HCW 
symptomatic contact screening groups, viral loads did not correlate with duration of 
symptoms or with clinical criteria risk score (Figure S1 and data not shown). 
 
Figure 1. SARS-CoV-2 RNA CT (cycle threshold) values for those individuals who 
tested positive shown according to HCW group: HCW asymptomatic screening group 
(green circles); HCW symptomatic or symptomatic household contact screening groups 
(blue squares). A Mann Whitney test was used to compare the two groups. Bars: median 
+/- interquartile range. Note that lower CT values correspond to earlier detection of the 
viral RNA in the RT-PCR process and therefore identify swabs with higher numbers of 
copies of the viral genome. 
 
 
Three subgroups of SARS-CoV-2 positive asymptomatic HCW 
Each individual in the HCW asymptomatic screening group was contacted by telephone 
to establish a clinical history, and COVID-19 probability criteria (Table S3) were 
retrospectively applied to categorise any symptoms in the month prior to testing (Figure 
2). One HCW could not be contacted to obtain further history. Individuals captured by 
the HCW asymptomatic screening group were generally asymptomatic at the time of 
screening, however could be divided into three sub-groups: (i) HCWs with no 
symptoms at all, (ii) HCWs with (chiefly low-to-medium COVID-19 probability) 
symptoms commencing ≤7 days prior to screening and (iii) HCWs with (typically high 
COVID-19 probability) symptoms commencing >7 days prior to screening (Figure 2). 
9/12 (75%) individuals with symptom onset >7 days previously had appropriately self-
isolated and then returned to work. One individual with no symptoms at the time of 
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swabbing subsequently developed symptoms prior to being contacted with their 
positive result.  Overall, 5/1032 (0.5%) individuals in the asymptomatic screening 
group were identified as truly asymptomatic carriers of SARS-CoV-2, and 1/1032 
(0.1%) was identified as pre-symptomatic. Table 2 shows illustrative clinical vignettes. 
 
Figure 2: Three subgroups of staff testing SARS-CoV-2 positive from the HCW 
asymptomatic screening group (central pie chart, described in detail in the main text). 
n=number of individuals (% percentage of total). The peripheral pie charts show 
number and percentage of individuals in groups (ii – right pie chart) and (iii – left pie 
chart) with low, medium and high COVID-19 probability symptoms upon retrospective 
analysis. 
 
Case 1: Completely asymptomatic. HCW1 had recently worked on four wards (two 
“green”, two “amber”). Upon testing positive, she reported no symptoms over the 
preceding three weeks, and was requested to go home and self-isolate immediately.  
HCW1 lived with her partner who had no suggestive symptoms. Upon follow-up 
telephone consultation 14 days after the test, HCW1 had not developed any 
significant symptoms, suggesting true asymptomatic infection. 
Case 2: Pre-symptomatic. HCW2 was swabbed whilst asymptomatic, testing 
positive. When telephoned with the result, she reported a cough, fever and headache 
starting within the last 24 hours and was advised to self-isolate from the time of onset 
of symptoms (Table S4).  . Her partner, also a HCW, was symptomatic and had been 
confirmed as SARS-CoV-2 positive 2 days previously, suggesting likely 
transmission of infection to HCW2. 
Case 3: Low clinical probability of COVID. HCW3 developed mild self-limiting 
pharyngitis three days prior to screening and continued to work in the absence of 
cough or fever. She had been working in ’green’ areas of the hospital, due to a 
background history of asthma. Self-isolation commenced from the time of the 
positive test. HCW3’s only contact outside the hospital, her housemate, was well. On 
follow-up telephone consultation, HCW3’s mild symptoms had fully resolved, with 
no development of fever or persistent cough, suggesting pauci-symptomatic 
infection. 
Case 4: Medium clinical probability of COVID. HCW4 experienced anosmia, 
nausea and headache three days prior to screening, and continued to work in the 
absence of cough or fever.  Self-isolation commenced from the time of the positive 
test. One son had experienced a mild cough ~3 weeks prior to HCW4’s test, however 
her partner and other son were completely asymptomatic. Upon follow-up telephone 
consultation 10 days after the test, HCW4’s mild symptoms had not progressed, but 
had not yet resolved. 
Case 5: High clinical probability of COVID. HCW5 had previously self-isolated, 
and did not repeat this in the presence of new high-probability symptoms six days 
before screening. Self-isolation commenced from the date of the new symptoms with 
the caveat that they should be completely well for 48 hours prior to return to work. 
All household contacts were well. However, another close colleague working on the 
same ward had also tested positive, suggesting potential transmission between 
HCWs on that ward. 
Table 2: Clinical vignettes. Self-isolation instructions were as described in Table S4. 
 
Identification of two clusters of cases by screening asymptomatic HCWs 
For the HCW asymptomatic screening group, nineteen wards were identified for 
systematic priority screening as part of hospital-wide surveillance. Two further areas 
were specifically targeted for screening due to unusually high staff sickness rates (ward 
F), or concerns about appropriate PPE usage (ward Q) (Figure 3, Table S5). 
Interestingly, in line with findings in the total HCW population, a significantly greater 
proportion of HCWs working on ‘red’ wards compared to HCWs working on ‘green’ 
wards tested positive as part of the asymptomatic screening programme (‘green’ 6/310 
vs ‘red’ 19/372; p=0∙0389, Fisher’s exact test). The proportion of HCW with a positive 
test was significantly higher on Ward F than on other wards categorised as ‘green’ 
clinical areas (ward F 4/43 vs other ‘green’ wards 2/267; p=0∙0040, Fisher’s exact test). 
Likewise, amongst wards in the ‘red’ areas, ward Q showed significantly higher rates 
of positive HCW test results (ward Q 7/37 vs other ‘red’ wards 12/335; p=0∙0011, 
Fisher’s exact test). 
  
Figure 3: Distribution of SARS-CoV-2 positive cases across 21 clinical areas, detected 
by ward-based asymptomatic screening (underlying data shown in Table S5). Wards 
are coloured (‘green’, ‘amber’, ‘red’) according to risk of anticipated exposure to 
COVID-19 (Table S1). HCWs working across >1 ward were counted for each area. The 
left-hand y-axis shows the percentage of positive results from a given ward compared 
to the total positive results from the HCW asymptomatic screening group (blue bars). 
The right-hand y-axis shows the total number of SARS-CoV-2 tests (stars) and the 
number positive (pink circles). Asymptomatic screening tests were also performed on 
an opportunistic basis in individuals working outside these areas, as well as in a 
subsequent intensified manner on ward F and ward Q after identification of clusters of 
positive cases on these wards (Figure 4). Results of these tests are included in summary 
totals in Table 1, but not in this figure. 
 
Ward F is an elderly care ward, designated as a ‘green’ area with Scenario 0 PPE 
(Tables S3-S4), with a high proportion of COVID-19 vulnerable patients due to age 
and comorbidity. 4/43 (9%) ward staff tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. In addition, 
two staff members on this ward tested positive in the HCW symptomatic/symptomatic 
contact screening groups. All positive HCWs were requested to self-isolate, the ward 
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was closed to admissions and escalated to Scenario 1 PPE (Table S2). Reactive 
screening of a further 18 ward F staff identified an additional three positive 
asymptomatic HCWs (Figure 4). Sequence analysis indicated that 6/9 samples from 
HCW who worked on ward F belonged to SARS-CoV-2 lineage B∙1 (currently known 
to be circulating in at least 43 countries20), with a further two that belonged to B1∙7 and 
one that belonged to B2∙1. This suggests more than two introductions of SARS-CoV-2 
into the HCW population on ward F (Figures S2-S3, Table S6). It was subsequently 
found that two further staff members from ward F had previously been admitted to 
hospital with severe COVID-19 infection. 
 
Figure 4. All SARS-CoV-2 positive HCW identified in Wards F and Q, stratified by 
their mechanism of identification. Individuals testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 in the 
‘HCW asymptomatic screening group’ were identified by the asymptomatic screening 
programme. Individuals testing positive in the ‘HCW symptomatic / symptomatic 
household contact groups’ were identified by self-presentation after developing 
symptoms. Individuals testing positive in the ‘Reactive screening group’ were 
identified by an intensified screening programme after initial positive clusters had been 
recognised. 
 
Ward Q is a general medical ward designated as a ‘red’ clinical area for the care of 
COVID-19 positive patients, with a Scenario 1 PPE protocol (Tables S3-S4). Here, 
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7/37 (19%) ward staff tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. In addition, one staff member 
tested positive as part of the HCW symptomatic screening group, within the same period 
as ward surveillance. Reactive screening of a further five ward Q staff uncovered one 
additional infection. 4/4 sequenced viruses were of the B∙1 lineage (Figures S2-S3, 
Table S6; other isolates could not be sequenced due to a sample CT value >30). All 
positive HCWs were requested to self-isolate, and infection control and PPE reviews 
were undertaken to ensure that environmental cleaning and PPE donning/doffing 
practices were compliant with hospital protocol. Staff training and education was 
provided to address observed instances of incorrect infection control or PPE practice. 
 
Ward O, a ‘red’ medical ward, had similar numbers of asymptomatic HCWs screened 
as ward F, and a similar positivity rate (4/44; 9%). This ward was listed for further 
cluster investigation after the study ended, however incorrect PPE usage was not noted 
during the study period. 
 
Characteristics of the HCW symptomatic and HCW symptomatic-contact screening 
groups 
The majority of individuals who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 after screening due 
to the presence of symptoms had high COVID-19 probability (Table 3). This reflects 
national guidance regarding self-isolation at the time of our study.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 Distribution of COVID-19 clinical probability scores for 
individuals with a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result  
 High Medium Low Total 
HCW 
symptomatic 
screening 
group 
22/26  
(85%) 
3/26  
(11%) 
1/26  
(4%) 
26/26 
(100%) 
HCW 
symptomatic 
household 
contacts 
3/4  
(75%) 
0/4  
(0%) 
1/4  
(25%) 
4/4 
(100%) 
Table 3. Distribution of positive SARS-CoV-2 tests amongst symptomatic individuals 
with a positive test result, categorised according to test group and COVID-19 
symptom-based probability criteria (as defined in Table S4). 
 
Discussion 
Through the rapid establishment of an expanded HCW SARS-CoV-2 screening 
programme, we discovered that 31/1,032 (3%) of HCWs tested positive for SARS-
CoV-2 in the absence of symptoms. Of 30 individuals from this asymptomatic 
screening group studied in more depth, 6/30 (20%) had not experienced any symptoms 
at the time of their test. 1/6 became symptomatic suggesting that the true asymptomatic 
carriage rate was 5/1,032 (0.5%)). 11/30 (37%) had experienced mild symptoms prior 
to testing. Whilst temporally associated, it cannot be assumed that these symptoms 
necessarily resulted from COVID-19. These proportions are difficult to contextualise 
due to paucity of point-prevalence data from asymptomatic individuals in similar 
healthcare settings or the wider community. For contrast, 60% of asymptomatic 
residents in a recent study tested positive in the midst of a care home outbreak.23 
Regardless of the proportion, however, many secondary and tertiary hospital-acquired 
infections were undoubtedly prevented by identifying and isolating these SARS-CoV-
2 positive HCWs. 
 
12/30 (40%) individuals from the HCW asymptomatic screening group reported 
symptoms >7 days prior to testing, and the majority experiencing symptoms consistent 
with a high probability of COVID-19 had appropriately self-isolated during that period. 
Patients with COVID-19 can remain SARS-CoV-2 PCR positive for a median of 20 
days (IQR 17-24) after symptom onset24, and the limited data available suggest viable 
virus is not shed beyond eight days.25 A pragmatic approach was taken to allowing 
individuals to remain at work, where the HCW had experienced high probability 
symptoms starting >7 days and ≤1 month prior to their test and had been well for the 
preceding 48 hours. This approach was based on the following: low seasonal incidence 
of alternative viral causes of high COVID-19 probability symptoms in the UK26, the 
high potential for SARS-CoV-2 exposure during the pandemic and the potential for 
prolonged, non-infectious shedding of viral RNA.24,25 For other individuals, we applied 
standard national guidelines requiring isolation for seven days from the point of 
testing.27 However, for HCW developing symptoms after a positive swab, isolation was 
extended for seven days from symptom onset. 
 
Our data clearly demonstrate that focusing solely on the testing of individuals fitting a 
strict clinical case definition for COVID-19 will inevitably miss asymptomatic and 
pauci-symptomatic disease. This is of particular importance in the presence of falling 
numbers of community COVID-19 cases, as hospitals will become potential epicentres 
of local outbreaks. Therefore, we suggest that in the setting of limited testing capacity, 
a high priority should be given to a reactive asymptomatic screening programme that 
responds in real-time to HCW sickness trends, or (to add precision) incidence of 
positive tests by area. The value of this approach is illustrated by our detection of a 
cluster of cases in ward F, where the potential for uncontrolled staff-to-staff or staff-to-
patient transmission could have led to substantial morbidity and mortality in a 
particularly vulnerable patient group. As SARS-CoV-2 testing capacity increases, 
rolling programmes of serial screening for asymptomatic staff in all areas of the hospital 
is recommended, with the frequency of screening being dictated by anticipated 
probability of infection. The utility of this approach in care-homes and other essential 
institutions should also be explored, as should serial screening of long-term inpatients. 
 
The early success of our programme relied upon substantial collaborative efforts 
between a diverse range of local stakeholders. Similar collaborations will likely play a 
key role in the rapid, de novo development of comprehensive screening programmes 
elsewhere. The full benefits of enhanced HCW screening are critically dependent upon 
rapid availability of results.  A key success of our programme has been bespoke 
optimisation of sampling and laboratory workflows enabling same-day resulting, whilst 
minimising disruption to hospital processes by avoiding travel to off-site testing 
facilities. Rapid turnaround for testing and sequencing is vital in enabling timely 
response to localised infection clusters, as is the maintenance of reserve capacity to 
allow urgent, reactive investigations. 
 
There appeared to be a significantly higher incidence of HCW infections in ‘red’ 
compared to ‘green’ wards. Many explanations for this observation exist, and this study 
cannot differentiate between them. Possible explanations include transmission between 
patients and HCW, HCW-to-HCW transmission, variability of staff exposure outside 
the workplace and non-random selection of wards. It is also possible that, even over the 
three weeks of the study, ‘red’ wards were sampled earlier during the evolution of the 
epidemic when transmission was greater. Further research into these findings is clearly 
needed on a larger scale. Furthermore, given the clear potential for pre-symptomatic 
and asymptomatic transmission amongst HCWs, and data suggesting that infectivity 
may peak prior to symptom onset11, there is a strong argument for basic PPE provision 
in all clinical areas.   
 
The identification of transmission within the hospital through routine data is 
problematic. Hospitals are not closed systems and are subject to numerous external 
sources of infection. Coronaviruses generally have very low mutation rates (~10-6 per 
site per cycle)28, with the first reported sequence of the current pandemic only published 
on 12th January 2020.29 In addition, given SARS CoV-2 was only introduced into the 
human population in late 2019, there is at present a lack of diversity in circulating 
strains. However, as the pandemic unfolds and detailed epidemiological and genome 
sequence data from patient and HCW clusters are generated, real-time study of 
transmission dynamics will become an increasingly important means of informing 
disease control responses and rapidly confirming (or refuting) hospital acquired 
infection. Importantly, implementation of such a programme would require active 
screening and rapid sequencing of positive cases in both the HCW and patient 
populations. Prospective epidemiological data will also inform whether hospital staff 
are more likely to be infected in the community or at work, and may identify risk factors 
for the acquisition of infection, such as congregation in communal staff areas or 
inadequate access to PPE. 
 
Our study is limited by the relatively short time-frame, a small number of positive tests 
and a lack of behavioural data. In particular, the absence of detailed workplace and 
community epidemiological data makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions with 
regards to hospital transmission dynamics. The low rate of observed positive tests may 
be partly explained by low rates of infection in the East of England in comparison with 
other areas of the UK (cumulative incidence 0∙17%, thus far).30 The long-term benefits 
of HCW screening on healthcare systems will be informed by sustained longitudinal 
sampling of staff in multiple locations. More comprehensive data will parametrise 
workforce depletion and COVID-19 transmission models. The incorporation of 
additional information including staffing levels, absenteeism, and changes in 
proportions of staff self-isolating before and after the introduction of widespread testing 
will better inform the impact of screening at a national and international level. Such 
models will be critical for optimising the impact on occupationally-acquired COVID-
19, and reducing the likelihood that hospitals become hubs for sustained COVID-19 
transmission.  
 
In the absence of an efficacious vaccine, additional waves of COVID-19 are likely as 
social distancing rules are relaxed. Understanding how to limit hospital transmission 
will be vital in determining infection control policy, and retain its relevance when 
reliable serological testing becomes widely available. Our data suggest that the roll-out 
of screening programmes to include asymptomatic as well as symptomatic patient-
facing staff should be a national and international priority. Our approach may also be 
of benefit in reducing transmission in other institutions, for example care-homes. Taken 
together, these measures will increase patient confidence and willingness to access 
healthcare services, benefiting both those with COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 disease. 
 
 
 
Materials and Methods 
Staff screening protocols 
A full description of methods can be found in Supplementary Information. Briefly, two 
parallel streams of entry into the testing programme were established. The first was 
operated by the Occupational Health department and allowed any patient-facing or non-
patient-facing hospital employee (HCW) to refer themselves or a household contact, 
including children, should they develop symptoms suggestive of COVID-19.  The 
second was a rolling programme of testing for all patient-facing and non-patient-facing 
staff working in defined clinical areas thought to be at risk of SARS-CoV-2 
transmission. A traffic-light colouring system was used to denote anticipated risk of 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission by ward (table S1), with different types of personal 
protective equipment (PPE) used in each (table S2). Inclusion into the programme was 
voluntary, and offered to all individuals working in a given ward during the time of 
sampling. Regardless of the route of entry into the programme, the process for testing 
and follow-up was identical. Wards were closed to external visitors. 
 
Self-isolation and household quarantine advice was determined by estimating the pre-
test probability of COVID-19 (high, medium or low) in those with symptoms, based on 
the presence or absence of typical features (tables S3-S4). Symptom history was 
obtained for all symptomatic HCWs at the time of self-referral, and again for all 
positive cases via telephone interview when results became available. All individuals 
who had no symptoms at the time of testing were followed up by telephone within 14 
days of their result. Pauci-symptomatic individuals were defined as those with low-
probability clinical COVID-19 criteria  (table S3). 
 
Laboratory methods 
The swabbing, extraction and amplification methods for this study follow a recently 
validated procedure.16 Individuals performed a self-swab at the back of the throat 
followed by the nasal cavity as previously described.2 The single dry sterile swab was 
immediately placed into transport medium/lysis buffer containing 4M guanidine 
thiocyanate to inactivate virus, and carrier RNA. This facilitated BSL2-based manual 
extraction of viral RNA in the presence of MS2 bacteriophage amplification control. 
Use of these reagents and components avoided the need for nationally employed testing 
kits. Real-time RT-PCR amplification was performed as previously described and 
results validated by confirmation of FAM amplification of the appropriate controls with 
threshold cycle (CT) ≤36. Lower CT values correspond to earlier detection of the viral 
RNA in the RT-PCR process, corresponding with a higher copy number of the viral 
genome. In 2/1,270 cases, RT-PCR failed to amplify the internal control and results 
were discarded, with HCW offered a re-test. Sequencing of positive samples was 
attempted on samples with a CT ≤30 using a multiplex PCR based approach17 using the 
modified ARTIC v2 protocol18 and v3 primer set.19 Genomes were assembled using 
reference based assembly and the bioinformatic pipeline as described17 using a 20x 
minimum coverage as a cut-off for any region of the genome and a 50∙1% cut-off for 
calling of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). Samples were sequenced as part of 
the COVID-19 Genomics UK Consortium, COG-UK), a partnership of NHS 
organisations, academic institutions, UK public health agencies and the Wellcome 
Sanger Institute. 
 
Data extraction and analysis 
Swab result data were extracted directly from the hospital-laboratory interface 
software, Epic (Verona, Wisconsin, USA). Details of symptoms recorded at the time of 
telephone consultation were extracted manually from review of Epic clinical records. 
Data were collated using Microsoft Excel, and figures produced with GraphPad Prism 
(GraphPad Software, La Jolla, California, USA). Fisher’s exact test was used for 
comparison of positive rates between groups defined in the main text. Mann-Whitney 
testing was used to compare CT values between different categories of tested 
individuals. HCW samples that gave SARS CoV-2 genomes were assigned global 
lineages defined by 20 using the PANGOLIN utility.21 
 
Ethics and consent: 
As a study of healthcare-associated infections, this investigation is exempt from 
requiring ethical approval under Section 251 of the NHS Act 2006 (see also the NHS 
Health Research Authority algorithm, available at http://www.hra-
decisiontools.org.uk/research/, which concludes that no formal ethical approval is 
required). Written consent was obtained from each HCW described in the anonymised 
case vignettes. 
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Supplementary Material 
 
 
Further details of HCW screening protocols.  
The HCW symptomatic and HCW household contact screening programme was 
managed jointly by the Occupational Health and Infectious Diseases departments. For 
the HCW asymptomatic group, the hospital’s system for categorising clinical areas 
according to COVID-19 risk is summarised in Table S1. Daily workforce sickness 
reports and trends in the results of HCW testing were monitored to enable areas of 
concern to be highlighted and targeted for screening and cluster analysis, in a reactive 
approach. High throughput clinical areas where staff might be exposed to large numbers 
of suspected COVID-19 patients were also prioritised for staff screening. These 
included the Emergency Department, the COVID-19 Assessment Unit, and a number 
of ‘red’ inpatient wards. Staff caring for the highest priory ‘shielding’ patients 
(Haematology/Oncology, Transplant medicine) were also screened, as were a 
representative sample of staff from ‘Amber’ and ‘Green’ areas.  The personal protective 
equipment (PPE) worn by staff in these areas is summarised in Table S2. 
 
 
Occupational Health Triage and Appointment Booking 
We devised a scoring system to determine the clinical probability of COVID-19 based 
on symptoms from existing literature1,2 (Table S3). Self-referring HCW and staff 
captured by daily workforce sickness reports were triaged by designated Occupational 
Health nurses using these criteria (Table S4). Self-isolating staff in the medium and low 
probability categories were prioritised for testing, since a change in the clinical 
management was most likely to derive from results. 
 
 
Sample collection procedures 
Testing was primarily undertaken at temporary on-site facilities. Two ‘Pods’ (self-
contained portable cabins with office, kitchen facilities, generator and toilet) were 
erected in close proximity both to the laboratory and main hospital. Outside space was 
designed to enable car and pedestrian access, and ensure ≥2 m social distancing at all 
times. Individuals attending on foot were given pre-prepared self-swabbing kits 
containing a swab, electronically labelled specimen tube, gloves and swabbing 
instructions contained in a zip-locked collection bag. Pods were staffed by a team of 
re-deployed research nurses, who facilitated self-swabbing by providing instruction as 
required. Scenario 1 PPE (Table S2) was worn by Pod nurses at all times. Individuals 
in cars were handed self-swabbing kits through the window, with samples dropped in 
collection bags into collection bins outside. Any children (household contacts) were 
brought to the pods in cars and swabbed in situ by a parent or guardian. 
 
In addition to Pod-based testing, an outreach HCW asymptomatic screening service was 
developed to enable self-swabbing kits to be delivered to HCWs in their area of work, 
minimising disruption to the working routine of hospital staff, and maximising Pod 
availability for symptomatic staff. Lists of all staff working in target areas over a 24-
hour period were assembled, and kits pre-prepared accordingly. Self-swabbing kits 
were delivered to target areas by research nurses, who trained senior nurses in the area 
to instruct other colleagues on safe self-swabbing technique. Kits were left in target 
areas for 24 hours to capture a full cycle of shift patterns, and all kits and delivery 
equipment were thoroughly decontaminated with 70% ethanol prior to collection. 
Twice daily, specimens were delivered to the laboratory for processing. 
 
Results reporting 
As soon as they were available, positive results were telephoned to patients by 
Infectious Diseases physicians, who took further details of symptomatology including 
timing of onset, and gave clinical advice (Table S4). Negative results were reported by 
Occupational Health nurses via telephone, or emailed through a secure internal email 
system. Advice on returning to work was given as described in Table S4. Individuals 
advised to self-isolate were instructed to do so in their usual place of residence. 
Particularly vulnerable staff or those who had more severe illness but did not require 
hospitalisation were offered follow-up telephone consultations. Individuals without 
symptoms at the time of testing were similarly followed up, to monitor for de novo 
symptoms. Verbal consent was gained for all results to be reported to the hospital’s 
infection control and health & safety teams, and to Public Health England, who 
received all positive and negative results as part of a daily reporting stream. 
 
 
 
Table S1. Categories of ward according to anticipated COVID-19 exposure risk 
 
Red (high risk) Amber (medium 
risk) 
Green (low risk) 
Areas with 
confirmed SARS-
CoV-2 RT-PCR 
positive patients, 
or patients with 
very high clinical 
suspicion of 
COVID-19 
 
Areas with patients 
awaiting SARS-
CoV-2 RT-PCR 
test results, or that 
have been exposed 
and may be 
incubating 
infection 
 
Areas with no 
known SARS-
CoV-2 RT-PCR 
positive patients, 
and none with 
clinically 
suspected COVID-
19 
 
 
  
 Table S2. Categories of clinical area according to personal protective equipment 
(PPE) protocol (‘PPE Scenarios’). 
 
 Personal protective equipment (PPE) ‘Scenarios’ 
Scenario 0 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
A
r
e
a
 d
e
sc
r
ip
ti
o
n
 All clinical areas 
without any known or 
suspected COVID-19 
cases 
Designated ward, triage 
and assessment-based 
care with suspected or 
confirmed COVID-19 
patients 
Cohorted areas where 
aerosol-generating 
procedures are carried 
out frequently with 
suspected or confirmed 
COVID-19 patients 
Operating theatres 
where procedures are 
performed with 
suspected or confirmed 
COVID-19 patients 
P
P
E
 d
e
sc
r
ip
ti
o
n
 Fluid resistant face 
mask at all times, apron 
and non-sterile gloves 
for patient contact 
(within two metres) 
Surgical scrubs, fluid 
resistant face mask, 
theatre cap, eye 
protection, apron and 
non-sterile gloves 
  
Water repellent gown, 
FFP3 mask, eye 
protection, theatre cap, 
surgical gloves, with an 
apron and non-sterile 
gloves in addition for 
patient contact (within 
two metres) 
Water repellent gown, 
FFP3 mask, eye 
protection, theatre cap 
and surgical gloves 
  
W
a
r
d
 c
a
te
g
o
r
ie
s 
Green wards, 
e.g. designated areas of  
emergency department 
and  medical 
admissions unit. 
Medical, surgical and 
haematology wards / 
outpatient clinics. 
Amber + red wards, 
e.g.  designated areas 
of emergency 
department and 
medical admissions 
unit. Designated 
CoVID-19 confirmed 
wards. 
Amber + red wards, 
e.g. intensive care unit, 
respiratory units with 
non-invasive 
ventilation facilities.  
All operating theatres, 
including facilities for 
bronchoscopy and 
endoscopy. 
 
All users of FFP3 masks underwent routine fit-testing prior to usage. Cleaning and re-
use of masks, theatre caps, gloves, aprons or gowns was actively discouraged. Cleaning 
and re-use of eye protection was permitted for certain types of goggles and visors, as 
specified in the hospital’s PPE protocol. Single-use eye protection was in use in most 
Scenario 1 and 2 areas, and was not cleaned and re-used. All non-invasive ventilation 
or use of high-flow nasal oxygen on laboratory-confirmed or clinically suspected 
COVID-19 patients was performed in negative-pressure (-5 pascals) side rooms, with 
10 air changes per hour and use of Scenario 2 PPE. All other aerosol generating 
procedures were undertaken with Scenario 2 PPE precautions, in negative- or neutral- 
pressure facilities. General clinical areas underwent a minimum of 6 air changes per 
hour, but all critical care areas underwent a minimum of 10 air changes per hour as a 
matter of routine. Surgical operating theatres routinely underwent a minimum of 25 air 
changes per hour. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table S3. Clinical criteria for estimating pre-test probability of COVID-19 
 
COVID-19 probability criteria 
Major Fever (>37.8 ˚C) 
New persistent cough 
Unprotected close contact with a confirmed case* 
Minor Hoarse voice 
Non-persistent cough 
Sore throat 
Nasal discharge or congestion 
Shortness of breath 
Wheeze 
Headache 
Muscle aches 
Nausea and/or vomiting and/or diarrhoea 
Loss of sense of taste or smell 
*Unprotected close contact defined as either face-to-face contact or 
spending more than 15 minutes within 2 metres of an infected 
person, without wearing appropriate PPE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table S4. Categories of pre-test probability of COVID-19, according to the 
presence of clinical features shown in table S1 
 
Stratification of COVID-19 probability Implications for exclusion from work 
High probability ≥2 major symptoms  
or  
≥1 major symptom and 
≥2 minor symptoms 
Self-isolate for 7 days from the date of onset, regardless of the 
test result. Only return to work if afebrile for 48 hours and 
symptoms have improved*. 
Household contacts should self-quarantine for 14 days from 
the date of symptom onset in the index case, regardless of the 
test result. If they develop symptoms, they should self-isolate 
for 7 days from the date of onset, and only return to work if 
afebrile for 48 hours and symptoms have improved*. 
Medium probability 1 major symptom  
or  
0 major symptoms and 
≥3 minor symptoms  
Test result positive: self-isolate for 7 days from the date of 
onset, and only return to work if afebrile for 48 hours and 
symptoms have improved*. Household contacts should self-
quarantine for 14 days from the date of index case symptom 
onset. If they develop symptoms, they should self-isolate for 7 
days from the date of onset, and only return to work if afebrile 
for 48 hours and symptoms have improved*. 
Test result negative: repeat testing at 48 hours from the initial 
swab. If repeat testing is positive, follow the advice detailed 
above. If repeat testing is negative, return to work, unless 
symptoms worsen. Self-quarantine not required for household 
contacts. 
Low probability 0 major symptoms and 
1-2 minor symptoms 
Test result positive: self-isolate for 7 days from the date of 
test, and only return to work if afebrile for 48 hours and 
symptoms have improved*. Household contacts should self-
quarantine for 14 days from the date of test. If they develop 
symptoms, they should self-isolate for 7 days from the date of 
onset, and only return to work if afebrile for 48 hours and 
symptoms have improved*. 
Test result negative: return to work, unless symptoms worsen. 
Self-quarantine not required for household contacts. 
Asymptomatic 0 major symptoms and 
0 minor symptoms 
Test result positive: self-isolate for 7 days from the date of 
test. If symptoms develop after the test, self-isolation should 
occur for 7 days from the date of onset, and return to work 
should only occur if afebrile for 48 hours and symptoms have 
improved*. Household contacts should self-quarantine for 14 
days from the date of the test. If they develop symptoms, they 
should self-isolate for 7 days from the date of onset, and only 
return to work if afebrile for 48 hours and symptoms have 
improved*. 
Test result negative: continue working, unless symptoms 
develop. Self-quarantine not required for household contacts. 
*Residual cough in the absence of other symptoms should not preclude returning to work. 
 
Table S5: Details of distribution of SARS-CoV-2 positive cases across 21 clinical 
areas selected for systematic ward-based asymptomatic screening (shown as 
Figure 3 in the main text). Areas are coloured (‘green’, ‘amber’, ‘red’) according to 
anticipated risk of exposure to COVID-19 (Table S1). HCWs working across >1 ward 
were counted for each area. In addition a number of individuals from other clinical 
areas were tested on an opportunistic basis, none of whom tested positive (not shown 
here but included in HCW asymptomatic screening group in Table 1), and an enhanced 
screening programme was subsequently provided for HCWs on wards F and Q (Figure 
4). 
 
 
 Clinical area / 
ward 
Positive tests 
/ Total tests 
G
re
en
 
A 0/26 
B 1/44 
C 0/30 
D 0/38 
E 1/54 
F 4/43 
G 0/15 
H 0/12 
I 0/17 
J 0/31 
Amber K 3/54 
R
ed
 
L 0/11 
M 1/35 
N 0/20 
O 4/44 
P 0/19 
Q 7/37 
R 3/72 
S 1/59 
T 2/42 
U 1/33 
  All areas 28/736 
 
 
Table S6: Details of each SARS-CoV-2 positive isolate from all HCWs and household contacts in the study.
Patient 
ID Type HCW_ward Ct value
Seq 
Attempted Seq_ID
% Sequence 
Coverage
Average Seq 
Depth
PANGOLIN 
lineage
C1 Symptomatic Contact  HCW Contact 23.9 Y CAMB-7FBB0 99.61 2048.5 B.1
C3 Symptomatic Contact  HCW Contact 23 N Not available
H3 Asymptomatic B 31 Y CAMB-7C0C3 98.61 835.084 B.1
H54 Symptomatic B 35
H12 Symptomatic C 16 Y CAMB-7FB92 99.60 3312.22 B.1
H19 Asymptomatic E 27 Y CAMB-7FC26 99.61 3632.26 B.1.1
C2 Asymptomatic F 15.5 Y CAMB-7FC08 99.60 3157.08 B.1
H17 Asymptomatic F 33.6 Y CAMB-7FBFC 99.61 1167.76 B.1
H20 Asymptomatic F 18 Y CAMB-7FC35 99.61 1350.65 B.1
H21 Asymptomatic F 22.8 Y CAMB-7FC44 99.60 3584.79 B.1
H22 Symptomatic F 24 Y CAMB-7FC53 99.60 3692.14 B.1.7
H23 Asymptomatic F 32.7 Y CAMB-7FC62 99.60 1610.33 B.2.1
H35 Symptomatic F 36 Y CAMB-8221F 73.00 104.391 B.1
H36 Asymptomatic F 29 Y CAMB-8222E 98.59 1882.65 B.1.7
H53 Symptomatic Contact HCW Contact 23
H38 Asymptomatic K 36 N Not available
H39 Asymptomatic K 31 N Not available
H28 Symptomatic K/R/L/T/OTHER 18 Y CAMB-7FD32 99.60 3770.36 B.1.11
H11 Asymptomatic M 32 Y CAMB-7FB83 99.60 1044.43 B.1
H32 Symptomatic N 33 Y CAMB-81007 97.62 1196.53 B.1
H47 Symptomatic N 32 N Not available
H31 Asymptomatic O 29 Y CAMB-80FFC 99.59 2286.08 B.1
H45 Asymptomatic O 36 N Not available
H51 Symptomatic O 33
H57 Symptomatic Contact O 23
H1 Asymptomatic OTHER 23 Y CAMB-7C0A5 98.61 2277.92 B.1
H6 Symptomatic OTHER 30 Y CAMB-7FB29 98.75 1317.43 B.1
H7 Symptomatic OTHER 26 Y CAMB-7FB47 99.61 3599.59 B.1
H10 Symptomatic OTHER 22 Y CAMB-7FB74 99.60 187.059 B.1
H14 Symptomatic OTHER 34 Y CAMB-7FBCF 99.61 1066.74 B.1
H16 Asymptomatic OTHER 27.8 Y CAMB-7FBED 99.60 796.874 B.1
H24 Symptomatic OTHER 21 Y CAMB-7FC80 98.62 916.884 B.1
H25 Symptomatic OTHER 21 Y CAMB-7FC9F 99.60 1505.09 B.1
H33 Symptomatic OTHER 35 Y CAMB-81016 90.92 233.779 B.1
H40 Symptomatic OTHER 23 N Not available
H46 Asymptomatic OTHER 36 N Not available
H55 Symptomatic Other 26
H56 Asymptomatic Other 32
H30 Asymptomatic OTHER/K/O/F 31 Y CAMB-80FDE 98.61 1773.74 B.1
H5 Symptomatic Q 24 Y CAMB-7C1A2 97.75 2342.24 B.1
H8 Symptomatic Q 14 Y CAMB-7FB56 99.60 2452.25 B.1
H18 Asymptomatic Q 30 Y CAMB-7FC17 99.60 2585.89 B.1
H29 Asymptomatic Q 31 Y CAMB-80AFB 99.60 2028.31 B.1
H42 Asymptomatic Q 35 N Not available
H44 Asymptomatic Q 28 N Not available
H48 Asymptomatic Q 36 N Not available
H49 Asymptomatic Q 35 N Not available
H4 Symptomatic R 24 Y CAMB-7C0D2 98.74 2083.89 B.1
H9 Symptomatic R 19 Y CAMB-7FB65 99.61 3288.11 B.1
H13 Symptomatic R 21 Y CAMB-7FBA1 99.60 3307.61 B.1
H27 Asymptomatic R 25 Y CAMB-7FCBD 98.61 1085.78 B.1
H34 Symptomatic R 30 Y CAMB-81025 99.60 1997.98 B.1
H37 Asymptomatic R 35 N Not available
H52 Asymptomatic R 34
H58 Symptomatic
R/S/A/Q/P/L/N/
M/K/Other
24
H15 Symptomatic S/N 32 Y CAMB-7FBDE 99.60 2246.43 B.1.7
H41 Asymptomatic S/Q 31 N Not available
H2 Asymptomatic T 36 Y CAMB-7C0B4 93.55 293.223 B.1
H26 Asymptomatic T 32 Y CAMB-7FCAE 0.03 0.189437 Not available
H50 Symptomatic T 34 N Not available
H43 Asymptomatic U 32 N Not available
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Figure S1: SARS-CoV-2 RNA CT values for HCWs testing positive according to presence 
and duration of symptoms. Results from the HCW symptomatic and HCW symptomatic 
contact groups are considered together in this figure. Individual CT values are shown, along 
with median and interquartile range for each group. 
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Figure S2. Further details of sequencing data. 
 
A) Comparisons of sequencing success rate vs Ct of HCW samples. Samples with CT less 
than 33 typically yielded genomes >90% coverage at a minimum depth of 20x. 
B) Lineage assignment of SARS CoV-2 genomes from HCW positive samples. Lineage 
assignments were generated using the PANGOLIN utility using a comparison against 
all currently circulating reference lineages. 
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Figure S3. Phylogenetic tree of 34 healthcare worker (HCW) SARS-CoV-2 genomes. 
Branch tips are coloured by HCW base ward. 34/35 sequenced genomes passed the filter of 
<2990 (~10%) N. A SARS-CoV-2 genome collected in Wuhan in December 2019 was selected 
to root the tree, visualised initially on Nextstrain (https://nextstrain.org/) and the fasta file was 
downloaded from GISAID (ID: EPI ISL 402123) (https://www.gisaid.org/). Multiple sequence 
alignment of consensus fasta files was performed using MAFFT3 with default settings. The 
alignment was manually inspected using AliView.4 A maximum likelihood tree was produced 
using IQ-TREE5 software with ModelFinder Plus option (-m MFP), which chooses the 
nucleotide substitution model that minimises Bayesian information criterion (BIC) score. The 
model "chosen" was TPM2u+F (details: http://www.iqtree.org/doc/Substitution-Models). The 
tree was manually inspected in FigTree6, rooted on the 2019 Wuhan sample, ordered by 
descending node and exported as a Newick file. The tree was visualised in the online software 
Microreact7 in a private account, exported as a png image, which is shown here. Due to low 
genetic diversity in the virus (very recent introduction) genomic similarity alone cannot be used 
to infer transmission chains, as viruses can be identical by chance. Achieving higher resolution 
on transmission chains requires integrating clinical and detailed epidemiological data with 
genomic data from HCW and patients to uncover plausible transmission pathways. 
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